faced with the responsibility of government. This is always a limitation and a check on revolutionary activity. There is a tendency to restrain free speech in the name of non-violence that might be abused. Terrorism has virtually collapsed. To-day I doubt whether anyone in India believes in it. Some have become convinced of the efficacy of Gandhian non-violence; others have become Marxists.

The history of Indian nationalism has only just begun. It is not yet possible to prophesy whether it will lead to a democratic republic on Soviet lines, whether it will attain freedom and develop along *bourgeois* lines, or strike out a new line for itself, or come to terms with the British against the common foe, the revolutionary masses. At least, the future will be interesting and full of potentialities.

Slowly and with much travail a nation is being born.

NOTE

But can one say that there is such a thing as Indian nationality? English writers in the past have liked to speak of the "peoples" of India, and they are convinced that only British might has kept India from becoming a number of warring states. It is possible that had it not been for the intervention of the British, India at a time of weakness might have given rise to sovereign states and gone through the anarchy and misery of internecine struggle from which Europe has not yet emerged.

But there is more unity historically in India than most people admit. Nehru has discussed this interestingly in an article in *Foreign Affairs* ("Unity of India," January 1938). In Hinduism, pilgrimages and the* conception of the sacred soil, which I mention in Chapter Six, gavs some conception of territorial unity from early days and there have been periods when virtually the whole continent was united under one ruler. Despite differences of language and even of race, there are real points of unity among Indians all over the country. There is the cultural unity of the Hindu background; from very early times it may be said that the